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Hippocampal Damage Increases Deontological Responses
during Moral Decision Making
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Complexmoral decisionmaking is associated with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in humans, and damage to this region signifi-
cantly increases the frequencyofutilitarian judgments.Since thevmPFChasstronganatomicalandfunctional linkswith thehippocampus,here
we asked how patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage would derivemoral decisions on a classic moral dilemmas paradigm.We
found that the patients approved of the utilitarian options significantly less often than control participants, favoring instead deontological
responses—rejectingactionsthatharmevenoneperson.Thus,patientswithhippocampaldamagehaveastrikinglyoppositeapproachtomoral
decision making than vmPFC-lesioned patients. Skin-conductance data collected during the task showed increased emotional arousal in the
hippocampal-damaged patients and they stated that their moral decisions were based on emotional instinct. By contrast, control participants
mademoral decisions based on the integration of an adverse emotional response to harming others, visualization of the consequences of one’s
action, and the rational re-evaluation of future benefits. This integration may be disturbed in patients with either hippocampal or vmPFC
damage. Hippocampal lesions decreased the ability to visualize a scenario and its future consequences, which seemed to render the adverse
emotional response overwhelmingly dominant. In patients with vmPFC damage, visualizationmight also be reduced alongside an inability to
detect theadverseemotionalresponse, leavingonlytheutilitarianoptionopen.Overall, theseresultsprovide insights intotheprocesses involved
inmoral decisionmaking and highlight the complementary roles played by two closely connected brain regions.
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Introduction
The hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
are often coactivated during neuroimaging studies that involve
such processes as autobiographical memory recall (Svoboda et
al., 2006), theory of mind (Spreng et al., 2009), and constructing
scenes and events in the imagination (Hassabis and Maguire,
2009). However, the precise contributions of the hippocampus
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Significance Statement
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is closely associated with the ability tomake complexmoral judgements.When this
area is damaged, patients become more utilitarian (the ends justify the means) and have decreased emotional arousal during
moral decisionmaking. The vmPFC is closely connectedwith another brain region—thehippocampus. In this studywe found that
patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage show a strikingly opposite response pattern to those with vmPFC damage
whenmakingmoral judgements. They rejected harmful actions of any kind (thus their responseswere deontological) and showed
increased emotional arousal. These results provide new insights into the processes involved in moral decision making and
highlight the complementary roles played by two closely connected brain regions.
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and vmPFC to these tasks remain unclear. One way to try to
dissociate their functional roles is to administer tasks typically
associated with one of these brain areas to patients with selective
damage to the other brain area. For example, the ability to men-
tally construct scenes, a process typically associated with the hip-
pocampus (Hassabis et al., 2007), has recently been shown to be
impaired in patients with vmPFC damage (Bertossi et al., 2016).
A classic hallmark of vmPFC damage is altered moral decision
making (Ciaramelli et al., 2007, 2012; Koenigs et al., 2007;
Thomas et al., 2011). Therefore, the goal of the current study was
to examine moral decision making in patients with selective bi-
lateral hippocampal damage.
The moral dilemmas task is an established means by which to
examine moral decision making. Participants read a short sce-
nario and make moral decisions about what action they person-
ally would take (Greene et al., 2001). Critically, the vmPFC seems
necessary for only one type of dilemma, namely those scenarios
typically described as being very personal and emotionally
charged (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). Even for
healthy controls, dealing with these personal dilemmas is diffi-
cult, as reflected in increased reaction times (Ciaramelli et al.,
2007; Terbeck et al., 2013) and in skin conductance responses
(Moretto et al., 2010). Koenigs et al. (2007) further dissociated
the personal dilemmas into two subgroups, low-conflict and
high-conflict dilemmas. Only in the high-conflict dilemmas is
one required to decide between killing one person to save the lives
of others (i.e., a utilitarian response) or never killing anyone (i.e.,
a deontological response) but being responsible for the deaths of
multiple people (Conway and Gawronski, 2013). These high-
conflict dilemmas create an internal tension between the emo-
tional rejection of harming somebody and the logical desire to
save lives (Shenhav and Greene, 2014; Wojciszke et al., 2015).
According to the dual-process theory of moral judgments
(Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2007), the vmPFC is crucial for
detecting the intuitive emotional rejection of harming someone.
Therefore, following vmPFC damage, one is left with only the
rational, utilitarian response as an option (Ciaramelli et al., 2007;
Greene, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Bertossi et al., 2016).
It is unclear how patients with selective bilateral hippocampal
damage would approach these high-conflict dilemmas. They
are able to think rationally, demonstrating intact high-level causal
reasoning, counterfactual thinking (Mullally and Maguire, 2014),
basic emotionalprocessing(ClarkandMaguire, 2016), andtheoryof
mind (Rosenbaum et al., 2007). Consequently, hippocampal-
damaged patients might not differ from controls. Conversely, pa-
tients with hippocampal damage show reduced empathy (Beadle et
al., 2013), possibly due to a diminished ability to vividly construct
another person’s situation (Clark andMaguire, 2016). In fact, visu-
alization of scenarios alters moral decision making in healthy con-
trols (Amit and Greene, 2012), suggesting a possibly important role
for scene construction in this task. Thus, patients with hippocampal
damage might respond differently to moral scenarios compared
with control participants.
To fully explore moral decision making during the dilemmas
task, we also acquired skin conductance as a measure of emo-
tional arousal (Tranel and Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1997)
and added following the task a debriefing that probed the strate-
gies participants used to make their decisions. Finally, to assess
possible personality changes in general following hippocampal
damage, close relatives of the patients completed the Iowa Scales
of Personality Change (Barrash et al., 2000, 2011). This question-
naire is commonly used to assess changes in emotional function-
ing and social behaviors in patients with vmPFC damage.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Five patients (allmales;mean age, 54.4 years; age range, 27–70 years)with
selective bilateral hippocampal lesions due to voltage-gated potassium
channel (VGKC)-complex antibody-mediated limbic encephalitis (LE)
were tested (Table 1, demographics). Patients with VGKC-complex LE
present with amnesia and seizures, followed by a non-reversible atrophy
typically confined to the hippocampus (Dalmau andRosenfeld, 2014; see
alsoMaguire et al., 2016 for further discussion of hippocampal damage in
this condition). In line with previous studies that have studied the
chronic VGKC-complex LE phenotype (Frisch et al., 2013), the patients
included here displayed selective memory impairment on tests of imme-
diate and delayed recall, and they had significantly fewer internal (epi-
sodic) details but not external (semantic) details compared with controls
on the Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002; Table 2). Deficits
were not apparent in any other cognitive or emotional domain, including
mood, executive functions, language, and perceptual abilities (Table 2).
Eleven control participants (all males; mean age, 57.1 years; age range,
25–77 years) who were closely matched to the patients on sex, age, and
general intellectual ability (Table 1), were also tested.
Each participant gave informed written consent to participation in
accordance with the approval of the local research ethics committee. For
patients, close relatives were also involved in the consenting process.
Characterization of hippocampal damage
All participants underwent structuralMR imaging using a 3.0Twhole-body
MR scanner (Magnetom TIM Trio, Siemens Healthcare) operated with a
radio frequency(RF) transmitbodycoil and32-channelheadRFreceivecoil.
In the first instance, imaging was limited to a partial volume focused
on the temporal lobes. These structural images were collected using a
single-slab 3D T2-weighted turbo spin echo sequence with variable flip
Table 1. Summary of demographic profile
Patient ID Gender Handedness
Age
(years)
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale
of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999)
Chronicity
Hippocampus
Scaled scores from
Matrix Reasoning
subtest
Scaled scores
from Similarities
subtest Left volume Right volume
HC01 Male Right 68 16 15 8 2759 3308
HC02 Male Right 70 12 13 9 2607 2755
HC04 Male Right 27 14 11 9 2819 2804
HC07 Male Right 48 15 15 5 2610 2702
HC08 Male Right 59 12 12 4 2506 2803
HC group 5 (males) 5 (right) Mean, 54.4; SD, 17.6 Mean, 13.8; SD, 1.8 Mean, 13.2; SD, 1.8 Mean, 7.0; SD, 2.3 Mean, 2660; SD, 126 Mean, 2874; SD, 245
CTL group 11 (males) 10 (right) Mean, 57.1; SD, 17.3 Mean, 14.0; SD, 1.5 Mean, 12.0; SD, 2.6 Not applicable Mean, 3191; SD, 357 Mean, 3277; SD, 335
p value of two-sample
t test
0.78 0.82 0.37 0.008a 0.037a
aSignificant difference.
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angles (SPACE; Mugler et al., 2000) in combination with parallel imag-
ing, to simultaneously achieve a high image resolution of500m, high
sampling efficiency, and short scan time while maintaining a sufficient
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). After excitation of a single axial slab, the
image was read out with the following parameters: resolution, 0.52 
0.52 0.5 mm3; matrix, 384 328; partitions, 104; partition thickness,
0.5 mm; partition oversampling, 15.4%; field of view, 200  171 mm2;
TE  353 ms; TR  3200 ms; generalized autocalibrating partially par-
allel acquisitions (GRAPPA)  2 in phase-encoding (PE) direction;
bandwidth, 434 Hz/pixel; echo spacing, 4.98 ms; turbo factor in PE di-
rection, 177; echo train duration, 881. K-space averaging was used to
boost SNRwith 90% resampling (i.e., average factor, 1.9) weighted to the
center of k-space. For reduction of signal bias due to, for example, spatial
variation in coil sensitivity profiles, the images were normalized using a
prescan, and a weak intensity filter was applied as implemented by the
scanner’s manufacturer. It took 12 min to obtain a scan. To improve the
SNR of the anatomical image, two or three scans were acquired for each
participant.
Images from each participant were coregistered and denoised follow-
ing the Rician noise estimation (Coupe´ et al., 2010). The denoised images
were averaged and smoothed with a full-width at half-maximum kernel
of 2  2  2 mm. Left and right hippocampi were then manually (and
blindly) segmented and volumes extracted using the ITK Snap software
version 3.4.0 (Yushkevich et al., 2006). As detailed on Table 1 (Fig. 1), we
found pronounced hippocampal volume loss in patients compared with
the control participants on the left [patients with hippocampal damage
(HC), 2660  126 mm3 (mean  SD); control participants (CTL),
3191 357mm3; t(12) 3.2, p 0.008, Cohen’s d 2.0] and right (HC,
2874 245mm3; CTL, 3277 335mm3; t(12) 2.3, p 0.037, Cohen’s
d 1.4).
To exclude group differences in moral decision making based on po-
tential differences in amygdalae volumes, left and right amygdalae were
also manually (and blindly) segmented following standard protocols
(Pruessner et al., 2000; Entis et al., 2012). Volumes of left (HC, 1403 
202 mm3; CTL, 1310 217 mm3; t(12) 0.79, p 0.45) and right (HC,
1422  319 mm3; CTL, 1308  246 mm3; t(12)  0.75, p  0.47)
amygdalae did not differ between patients and controls.
To rule out consistent differences between patients and controls in
gray matter volume elsewhere in the brain (e.g., in the vmPFC) we also
collected a whole-brain structural T1-weighted sequence at an isotropic
resolution of 800 m (Callaghan et al., 2015) using a field of view of 256
mmhead–foot, 224mm anterior–posterior (AP), and 166mm right–left
(RL) on which to conduct a voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analysis.
This was a spoiled multiecho 3D fast low-angle shot acquisition with a
flip angle of 21° and a repetition time (TR) of 25 ms. To accelerate the
data acquisition, partially parallel imaging using the GRAPPA algorithm
was used in each PE direction (AP and RL) with 40 reference lines and a
speed-up factor of two. Gradient echoes were acquired with alternating
readout polarity at eight equidistant echo times ranging from 2.34 to
18.44 ms in steps of 2.30 ms using a readout bandwidth of 488 Hz/pixel
(Helms and Dechent, 2009). The first six echoes were averaged to in-
crease SNR (Helms andDechent, 2009), producing a T1-weighted image
with an effective echo time of 8.3 ms, which was used for the VBM
analysis.
An automated VBM analysis was performed using SPM12 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Lon-
don, UK). The averaged T1-weighted images were segmented into gray
and white matter probability maps using the unified segmentation ap-
proach (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). Intersubject registration of the
tissue classes was performed using Dartel, a non-linear diffeomorphic
algorithm (Ashburner, 2007). The resulting Dartel template and defor-
mations were used to normalize the tissue probability maps to the ste-
reotactic space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute template.
ForVBManalysis, the normalization procedure includedmodulating the
Table 2. Summary of neuropsychological profile
Group
Autobiographical Interview scoresb
Immediate
recall
memoryc
Delayed
recall
memoryd
Recognition
memorye
Semantic
memoryf
Working
memoryg
Language
abilitiesh
Executive
functionsi Perceptionj Moodk
Internal
(episodic)
details
External
(semantic)
details
Hippocampal-damaged patients
Mean 33.0 5.7 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.1
SD 6.5 4.1 0.4 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.5 1.7 1.1
Healthy control participants
Mean 51.3 5.9 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
SD 13.6 2.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8
p value of two-sample t test 0.02a 0.94 0.003a 0.04a 0.59 0.66 0.37 0.66 0.19 0.3 0.95
With the exception of the Autobiographical Interview scores, which are shown as standard means, scores (where available scaled scores) of individual tests have been transformed into z-scores and averaged across patients and controls
within each neuropsychological domain. Therefore, a mean z-score of zero indicates that both groups had the samemean.
aSignificant difference.
bAutobiographical memory performance of the patients (Levine et al., 2002) was compared to a separate control group (5 males; 1 female; mean age, 55.2 18 years; range, 22–69 years; all right-handed).
cWechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997), logical memory 1 units and thematic scores, word list 1 total recall, and Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (Osterrieth, 1944) immediate recall.
dWMS-III logical memory 2 units and thematic scores, and Rey-Osterrieth complex figure delayed recall.
eWarrington Recognition Memory Test for words and faces (Warrington, 1984), WMS-III word list 2 recognition.
fWarrington Graded Naming Test (McKenna andWarrington, 1980; Warrington, 2010).
gWMS-III digit span subtest.
hDelis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001) letter fluency and category fluency tests.
iD-KEFS category switch test, word-color interference test, trails test (average of visual scanning, number sequencing, letter sequencing, number–letter switching, andmotor speed tests), Hayling Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997) Sentence
Completion Test.
jVisual Object and Space Perception Battery (Warrington and James, 1991) dot counting, cube analysis, position discrimination tests, and the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure copy.
kHospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983).
Figure 1. Characterization of hippocampal damage. Example T2-weighted coronal struc-
tural MR images of a healthy control participant (top) and a patient with bilateral hippocampal
damage (bottom). The hippocampi are marked in green. Images are displayed in native space
correspondingapproximately to thepositionof y10 in theMontrealNeurological Institute
coordinate system.
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gray matter tissue probability maps by the Jacobian determinants of the
deformation field and smoothing with an isotropic Gaussian smoothing
kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum. The normalized gray matter
from controls and the patients with hippocampal damage were con-
trasted using a two-sample t test and thresholded at p  0.001 uncor-
rected and a cluster extend of 50 voxels. This whole-brain analysis
revealed no significant differences outside of the hippocampus between
the gray matter volumes of healthy controls and patients.
Moral dilemmas task
The main focus of this study was to assess how patients with bilateral
hippocampal damage would perform on a moral dilemmas task usually
associated with an increased number of utilitarian responses in patients
with vmPFCdamage.We therefore opted to administer themoral dilem-
mas task following as closely as possible the procedure described by
Koenigs et al. (2007).
The task consisted of 50 hypothetical scenarios originally based on a
study byGreene et al. (2001) but adapted byKoenigs et al. (2007). For the
scenarios, we used the exact wording from the supplementary material
(Koenigs et al., 2007), just changing American to British references (e.g.,
dollars to pounds, etc.).
Each scenario was presented on three consecutive text slides on a
computer screen. The first two text slides described the scenario and the
third slide always posed a question about an action related to the scenario
in the formof “Would you…, to…?”. Participants pressed an “up” arrow
key to advance to the next slide, and a “yes” and “no” button for the third
slide. For the first two slides, there was no time limit and for the third
slide there was a time limit of 25 s to read the question and respond. The
scenarios were presented in a pseudorandom order so that never more
than two scenarios of the same class were presented consecutively. Fur-
ther, the task was divided into five sessions each containing 10 scenarios.
The breaks between sessions (nomore than 3min)were just long enough
to ensure that the participants were able to continue with the task and
remembered the instructions.
The scenarios fell into the four classes based on previous studies
(Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007). These were (1) non-moral
scenarios, (2) impersonal scenarios, (3) personal low-conflict scenarios,
and (4) personal high-conflict scenarios.
Non-moral scenarios. In the non-moral scenarios (n  18), partici-
pants had to follow the logic of a story without a moral dimension. For
example: “You are a farm worker driving a turnip-harvesting machine.
You are approaching two diverging paths (slide 1). By choosing the path
on the left youwill harvest ten bushels of turnips. By choosing the path on
the right you will harvest twenty bushels of turnips. If you do nothing
your turnip-harvestingmachine will turn to the left (slide 2).Would you
turn your turnip-harvestingmachine to the right to harvest twenty bush-
els of turnips instead of ten (slide 3)?”
Impersonal scenarios. In the impersonal scenarios (n  11), partici-
pants had tomakemoral judgments that aremore intuitively impersonal
and less emotional. A common example for this category is often the
standard trolley scenario in which one has to turn a switch to divert a
runaway trolley from the tracks with five people on it toward a track with
only one person on it. Many of these impersonal dilemmas, however, do
not involve the death of people and describe actions that are milder. For
example: “You are walking down the street when you come across a
wallet lying on the ground. You open the wallet and find that it contains
several hundred pounds in cash as well as the owner’s driver’s license
(slide 1). From the credit cards and other items in the wallet it’s very clear
that the wallet’s owner is wealthy. You, on the other hand, have been hit
by hard times recently and could really use some extra money. You
consider sending the wallet back to the owner without the cash, keeping
the cash for yourself (slide 2). Would you keep the money you found in
the wallet to have more money for yourself (slide 3)?”
Personal low-conflict scenarios. In the personal low-conflict scenarios
(n 8), participants had tomakemoral judgments that are personal and
highly emotional. According to Koenigs et al. (2007), these are scenarios
that typically result in rejection of the outlined action by healthy partic-
ipants and patients with vmPFC damage. Most of these scenarios do not
involve the loss of lives but contain inexcusable, self-beneficial outcomes
as a consequence of quite terrible actions. For example: “You are driving
along a country road when you hear a plea for help coming from some
roadside bushes. You pull over and encounter a man whose legs are
covered with blood. The man explains that he has had an accident while
hiking and asks you to take him to a nearby hospital (slide 1). Your initial
inclination is to help this man, who will probably lose his leg if he does
not get to the hospital soon.However, if you give thisman a lift, his blood
will ruin the leather upholstery of your car (slide 2).Would you leave this
man by the side of the road to preserve your leather upholstery (slide 3)?”
Personal high-conflict scenarios. In the personal high-conflict scenarios
(n  13), participants had to make moral judgments that are personal,
highly emotional, and controversial. These scenarios typically do not
receive unanimous rejection from healthy participants. Importantly, for
this category ofmoral dilemma, patients with vmPFCdamage, compared
with controls, approved of the utilitarian option significantly more often
(Koenigs et al., 2007). For most of these scenarios, the moral question is
whether to take a life with your own hands to save the lives of others. For
example: “You are the captain of a military submarine, traveling under-
neath a large iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most
of your oxygen supply and has injured one of your crew who is quickly
losing blood. The injured crew member is going to die from his wounds
nomatter what happens (slide 1). The remaining oxygen is not sufficient
for the entire crew tomake it to the surface. The onlyway to save the other
crewmembers is to shoot dead the injured crewmember so that therewill
be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to survive (slide 2). Would
you kill the fatally injured crewmember to save the lives of the remaining
crew members (slide 3)?”
Galvanic skin responses
We used skin conductance as a dependent measure of emotional arousal
and autonomic activity in response to the scenarios (Tranel and Dama-
sio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1997). For each participant, skin conductance
was recorded in a magnetically shielded room on the volar surface of the
middle and index finger of the left hand using disposable Ag/AgCl-
laminated electrodes (EL509 RT dry electrodes, Biopac Systems) and
isotonic recording electrode gel (Gel 101, Biopac Systems). This allowed
the dominant right hand to be free for performing the button presses
necessary for the task. The electrodes were attached to a custom-built
constant-voltage coupler (2.5 V), based on a differential amplifier and
DC-powered by a 12 V battery. The output of the coupler was converted
into an optical pulse frequency. This pulse signal was transmitted using
an optical fiber, digitally converted outside the shielded room with 2 s
time resolution (Micro1401, Cambridge Electronic Design), and re-
corded (Spike2, Cambridge Electronic Design). Stimulus onset was sig-
naled by transistor–transistor logic pulses via the stimulus computer’s
parallel port, and corresponded to the onset of the three text slides and
the final response to the question on slide three. Thus, for each scenario,
four time points were marked with triggers.
Data analysis was performed using SCRalyze (Bach et al., 2009) fol-
lowing the general linear convolution model for evoked skin conduc-
tance responses. This protocol included bandpass filtering (first-order
Butterworth filter, 0.0159 and 5 Hz cutoff frequencies, sequentially for-
ward and backward), downsampling the data to 10 Hz, and normalizing
the data to avoid between-subject differences in response amplitude due
to peripheral factors, such as skin properties. Data were then concate-
nated over the five sessions, and parameter estimates were calculated for
each condition. Since each scenario was associated with four marked
time points (i.e., slides 1, 2, 3, and the final response) and scenarios were
sorted into four categories (i.e., non-moral, impersonal, personal low-
conflict, and personal high-conflict), there were 16 parameter estimates
for each participant. The resulting  values were then averaged across
time points for each dilemma category and exported for statistical
analyses.
Debriefing
As evident from the examples, some of these scenarios posed very diffi-
cult moral questions. It was important for us to capture the emotional
impact of performing the task and the cognitive strategies used to make
the moral decisions. Therefore, we asked each participant the following
12160 • J. Neurosci., November 30, 2016 • 36(48):12157–12167 McCormick et al. • Hippocampal Damage and Moral Judgments
debriefing questions immediately after the conclusion of the task: (1)Did
you have any problems keeping track of the story line of the scenarios?
(Here, we aimed to assess whether the patients experienced difficulties
related to their memory problem); (2) What was your strategy in re-
sponding to the scenarios? In particular, how did you decide for the
sacrificial scenarios? Did this differ in any way from the other scenarios?
How emotional did you find these scenarios?; (3) Did you imagine a
scene in your mind’s eye? Did that differ between non-sacrificial and
sacrificial ones?; (4) Did you know any of the scenarios from before the
experiment? (All participants answered “no” to this question).
Iowa Scales of Personality Change
To gain insight into whether personality changes usually associated with
vmPFC lesions are also present in patients with hippocampal damage, we
asked close relatives of the patients to complete the Iowa Scales of Per-
sonality Change (ISPC). This questionnaire consists of 30 scales. Twenty-
six of these scales assess personality characteristics shown to change after
vmPFC damage, including emotional functioning, behavioral control,
social and interpersonal behavior, and higher-order cognitive abilities,
such as decision making and insight (Barrash et al., 2000, 2011). In ad-
dition, there are four scales that are not associated with acquired brain
damage that act as control scales to detect possible response bias. These
scales measured frugality, vanity, manipulativeness, and type-A behav-
ior. In the questionnaire, each characteristic is introduced by a brief
description, followed by two rating scales. The relative is asked to rate the
behavior before and after (so how it is now) the onset of hippocampal
damage. Both ratings are made along a seven-point rating scale, with
three being the average or usual level of a typical adult, and with higher
ratings reflecting an increasing level of that behavior. Points of the scale
are accompanied by example statements that help the relative choose an
appropriate level. Importantly, relatives are instructed to rate exclusively
the patient’s behavior regardless of their belief about why the character-
istic is at its current level.
The sensitive measure of the ISPC is based on the change scores calcu-
lated as the difference between premorbid and postmorbid level ratings.
In our analysis, we excluded two scales that only assessed the postmorbid
stage and therefore did not yield change scores. For all other 24 scales, we
calculated the difference between postmorbid and premorbid level rat-
ings. Positive values (maximum, 6) therefore reflect an increase and neg-
ative values (maximum,6) reflect a decrease in a particular behavior.
We were also interested in whether personality traits differed between
patients with vmPFC and hippocampal damage. To illustrate the main
differences, an exploratory analysis was conducted to compare the
change values of our patient cohort with the previously published change
scores for patients with vmPFC damage (Barrash et al., 2000). Of note, in
this latter study, relatives had to indicate a direct change measure on a
five-point scale, whereas the current study used before and after ratings
on a seven-point scale to calculate the change score.
Data analyses
Statistical significance levels of response proportion, reaction times, and
skin conductance were assessed using separate two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA (2way-RM-ANOVA) with participant group (pa-
tients, controls) as a factor with two levels and classes of moral dilemma
as a repeated-measurement factor with four levels (non-moral, impersonal,
personal-low, and personal-high). Main effects and interaction effects were
evaluated first and a two-sided p value of0.05 was used as a threshold to
reject the null hypotheses in each case. Where 2way-RM-ANOVAs yielded
significant main or interaction effects, we conducted post hoc comparisons
between groups and dilemma classes using Sidak’s multiple-comparison
tests, again considering p values0.05 as statistically significant.
Independent pairwise comparisons between the two groups (e.g., hip-
pocampal volumes, neuropsychological test scores) were assessed using
the Student’s two-sample t test. Again, a two-sided p value of0.05 was
used as the threshold to reject the null hypotheses in each case.
We also report the effect sizes (using Cohen’s d) and, where appropri-
ate, show the data of every participant.
We explored the personality change scores from our patients with hip-
pocampal damage and those of patients with vmPFC damage assessed with
the ISPC. For patients with vmPFC damage, we only had access to sample
size, mean, and SD (Barrash et al., 2000). Here, we conducted a 2way-
ANOVA (2 groups 28 personality traits). First, the significance of main
effects and interaction termwas assessed as before using a two-sided p value
of 0.05. Since the interaction term reached significance, we performed
pairwise comparisons using Fisher’s least significant difference test between
the means of both groups for each personality trait, again considering a
two-sided p value of0.05 a significant result. In this exploratory analysis,
we opted not to correct formultiple comparisons since eachmean was only
compared with that of the other group for a specific personality trait and
therefore never entered a comparisonmore than once.
Results
Moral dilemmas task
Figure 2a illustrates the proportion of yes responses to each of the
four scenario classes for patients with bilateral hippocampal
damage and matched healthy control participants. We found a
significant main effect of group (F(1,14)  7.98, p  0.013) and
scenario class (F(3,42)  88.99, p  0.0001), and an interaction
effect between group and scenario class (F(3,42)  5.61, p 
0.0025).
There were no differences between the groups in the pro-
portion of yes responses for non-moral (HC, 57.8 4.9; CTL,
61.6  5.2; t(56)  0.61, p  0.96), impersonal (HC, 54.5 
18.2; CTL, 59.5  11.8; t(56)  0.79, p  0.9), and personal
low-conflict scenarios (HC, 0.0  0.0; CTL, 2.7  5.1; t(56) 
0.36, p  0.99), indicating that the patients did not have dif-
ficulties following the logic of the scenarios and they were able
to keep the information in their short-term memory to re-
spond adequately and appropriately.
Interestingly, for the personal high-conflict scenarios, the pa-
tients approved the utilitarian option (i.e., proportion of yes re-
sponses) significantly less often than did the healthy controls
(HC, 33.8  13.9; CTL, 65.0  18.6; t(56)  4.97, p  0.0001,
Cohen’s d  1.90). Whereas each low-conflict scenario resulted
in strong rejections from patients and controls alike, the patients
were specifically much less likely than control participants to
approve the utilitarian option for the vast majority of the high-
conflict scenarios (Fig. 2b).
It is interesting to contrast the moral decision making of our
hippocampal-damagedpatients to that of the previously reported
behavior of patients with vmPFC damage [from Koenigs et al.,
2007; vmPFC patients: n  6; 3 males; mean age, 59.2 years old
(SD 8.7); all right-handed; mean years of education, 12.5 (SD,
1.9)]. From this perspective, the low utilitarian response rate of
our patients is especially interesting since it was these high-
conflict scenarios that patients with vmPFC damage approved
more often than healthy controls. In fact, contrasting the ap-
proval rate of the current hippocampal-damaged patients di-
rectly to that of patients with vmPFC lesions demonstrates the
clear difference between the two patient cohorts. Patients with
vmPFC damage approved the utilitarian option more often than
patients with hippocampal damage (HC, 33.8  13.9; vmPFC,
70.5 29.4; t(9) 2.6, p 0.03, Cohen’s d 1.61).
Reaction times
There was a significant main effect of scenario class (F(3,42) 
26.9, p 0.0001) but no main effect of group (F(1,14) 3.8, p
0.072) or interaction effect (F(3,42) 0.23, p 0.8). Hence, both
patients and controls showed the same pattern of reaction times
across the four scenario classes. As expected, both groups spent
longer on the personal high-conflict than on the non-moral
(baseline) scenarios (HC: non-moral, 27.8 8.9 s; personal high,
36.4  10.1 s; t(42)  4.74, p  0.001, Cohen’s d  0.9; CTL:
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non-moral, 22.3 4.3 s; personal high, 30.1 7.9 s; t(42) 6.32,
p  0.0001, Cohen’s d  1.3), impersonal (HC: impersonal,
29.8 8.3 s; personal high, 36.4 10.1 s; t(42) 3.6, p 0.005,
Cohen’s d  0.7; CTL: impersonal, 22.9  5.6 s; personal high,
30.1 7.9 s; t(42) 5.9, p 0.001, Cohen’s d 1.1), and personal
low-conflict scenarios (HC: personal low, 28.1 5.9 s; personal
high, 36.4 10.1 s; t(42) 4.5, p 0.001, Cohen’s d 1.0; CTL:
personal low, 21.1 4.2 s; personal high, 30.1 7.9 s; t(42) 7.3,
p 0.001, Cohen’s d 1.4).
Galvanic skin responses
In addition to behavioral responses, we also acquired skin con-
ductance responses during task performance. Figure 3 illustrates
the averaged values for the four scenario classes for patients and
controls. We were unable to collect skin conductance responses
from one control participant because of technical problems.
The skin conductance results below are therefore based on five
patients with hippocampal damage and 10 healthy control
participants.
We found a main effect of scenario class (F(3,39)  9.8, p 
0.0001) and group membership (F(1,13) 36.2, p 0.0001) but
no interaction effect (F(3,39) 0.58, p 0.63). Both patients and
controls showed increased skin conductance responses for the
personal high-conflict compared with the non-moral (baseline)
scenarios (HC: non-moral, 0.28 0.1; personal high, 0.68 0.3;
t(39) 2.9, p 0.041, Cohen’s d 1.8; CTL: non-moral,0.26
0.2; personal high, 0.01  0.2; t(39)  3.1, p  0.025, Cohen’s
d 0.8). In addition, controls also showed an increased response
for the personal low-conflict compared with the non-moral
(CTL: non-moral,0.26 0.2; personal low, 0.21 0.4; t(39)
4.6, p 0.003, Cohen’s d 1.5) and impersonal scenarios (CTL:
impersonal, 0.11  0.2; personal low, 0.21  0.4; t(39)  3.1,
p 0.022, Cohen’s d 1.0).
Interestingly, compared with the healthy control participants,
the patients showed increased skin conductance responses for all
scenario classes (non-moral: HC, 0.28 0.1; CTL,0.26 0.2;
t(52) 3.9, p 0.001, Cohen’s d 3.4; impersonal: HC, 0.36
0.2; CTL, 0.11  0.2; t(52)  3.4, p  0.005, Cohen’s d  1.3;
personal low: HC, 0.63  0.3; CTL, 0.21  0.4; t(52)  0.1, p 
0.013, Cohen’s d  1.2; personal high: HC, 0.68  0.3; CTL,
0.01  0.2; t(52)  4.6, p  0.001, Cohen’s d  3.1). These
finding indicate that both groups show the same overall pattern,
namely increased emotional arousal to personal high-conflict
scenarios. However, patients with hippocampal damage had gen-
erally increased skin conductance levels.
Debriefing
No participant reported any difficulty in keeping track of the
scenarios, and this accords with the behavioral responses being
Figure 2. Moral judgments for each scenario class. a, The percentage of “yes” responses for
individual patients with hippocampal damage (HC, red symbols) and healthy control partici-
pants (CTL, blue circles). The height of the bars represents the mean. On personal high-conflict
scenarios, patients with hippocampal damage, compared to healthy controls, responded sig-
nificantly less often with “yes” (****p 0.0001). b, Percentage of “yes” responses are shown
for each personal scenario given by patients with hippocampal damage (red symbols) and by
healthy controls (blue circles). Individual scenarios are ordered by increasing frequency of “yes”
responses by healthy controls. Responses did not differ for the low-conflict scenarios. For the
majority of high-conflict scenarios, patients with hippocampal damage responded less often
with “yes” compared with the healthy controls.
Figure 3. Skin conductance responses for each scenario class. Skin conductance responses
are shown for individual patients with hippocampal damage (HC, red symbols) and healthy
control participants (CTL, blue circles). The height of the bars represents the mean. *p 0.05;
**p 0.01; ***p 0.001. Between-group effects are indicated in black; within-group effects
are indicated in color (HC in red, CTL in blue). Both groups reacted with increased skin conduc-
tance in response to the personal high-conflict compared with the non-moral (baseline) sce-
narios. In addition, hippocampal-damaged patients showed increased skin conductance to all
scenario classes relative to the healthy controls.
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similar for both patients and controls for non-moral, impersonal,
and person low-conflict scenarios.
The responses of patients and controls did differ, however, in
the strategies they used to answer the personal high-conflict sce-
narios (Fig. 4). Whereas controls reported an initial emotional
response of how terrible it would be to kill a person, they were
then able to foresee the rational benefits of savingmultiple lives in
the long run. In contrast, patients with hippocampal damage
reported an instinctive emotional aversion to harming anybody.
In addition, controls typically created an elaborate theory over
the course of the task on how to decide on these conflicts, such as
approving of the utilitarian option if the person to be sacrificed
was a fatally wounded soldier or if you are an elected leaderwhose
role it is to oversee the well being of others. The patients, on the
other hand, did not report any such strategies. Their explanation
of why they responded as they did was almost entirely based on
gut feeling and a sense of what felt right and wrong for each
scenario individually.
Interestingly, the patients reported that they did not tend to
visualize the personal high-conflict scenarios. By contrast, the
control participants commonly reported visualizing the scenes
surrounding the scenarios, with the scenes associated with the
high-conflict scenarios being particularly elaborate and visually
intense.
ISPC
Questionnaire responses from close relatives of all five patients
were included in the analysis. All relatives knew the to-be-rated
patient very well (mean years knowing the patient, 32.4 10.1).
Figure 5a illustrates the findings from this questionnaire.
Of all 28 scales that assessed a change from before to after
onset of illness, the five personality characteristics that changed
the most in patients with bilateral hippocampal damage were as
follows: (1) easily overwhelmed (mean 2.4  2.1); (2) depen-
dency (mean 2.0 1.4); (3) lack of stamina (mean 1.8 2.5); (4)
lack of initiative (mean 1.8  1.5); and (5) social withdrawal
(mean 1.8 1.8).
We were also interested in exploring behavioral changes fol-
lowing hippocampal damage compared with vmPFC damage.
We therefore examined the difference in change for all personal-
ity characteristics between our patients with hippocampal dam-
age and already published data from patients with vmPFC
damage [Barrash et al., 2000, 2011; vmPFC patients: n  7; 5
males; mean age, 59.0 years (SD, 12.4); mean years of education,
11.4 (SD 2.0)]. We found a significant interaction effect between
change scores for the two patient groups (F(23,240)  1.6, p 
0.046). Figure 5b illustrates these differences in three main parts
for all 24 scales previously found to be sensitive to vmPFC
damage.
The first part depicts changes that are greater following
vmPFC damage than following hippocampal damage. These in-
clude irritability (HC, 0.2 1.5; vmPFC, 2.1 0.4; t(240) 2.7,
p  0.007, Cohen’s d  1.7) and inappropriate emotion (HC,
0.8 0.8; vmPFC, 2.3 0.8; t(240) 2.2, p 0.033, Cohen’s d
1.8). The second, largest part of the graph (Fig. 5b) illustrates
personality characteristics that did not differ between both pa-
tient groups and therefore appear to change following damage to
either the hippocampus or vmPFC. This is an interesting finding,
since some of the scales tap social and emotional functioning,
including insensitivity, impulsivity, and lack of initiative, that
have not been reported before to change following hippocampal
damage. The third part of the graph illustrates personality char-
acteristics that change in patients with hippocampal damage be-
yond those previously found changed in patients with vmPFC
damage. These include scales indicating a tendency to become
easily overwhelmed (HC, 2.4  2.1; vmPFC, 0.6  0.6; t(240) 
2.6, p 0.01, Cohen’s d 1.1) and a borderline effect for social
withdrawal (HC, 1.8  1.8; vmPFC, 0.7  0.7; t(240)  1.7, p 
0.087, Cohen’s d  0.8). Of note, one has to keep in mind not
only the exploratory nature of this analysis, but also that the scales
of this questionnaire were constructed based on vmPFC pathol-
ogy. Thus, the changes in personality in hippocampal-damaged
patients may have very different causes. For example, patients
with hippocampal damage who are aware of their memory im-
pairment might lack initiative because they simply cannot re-
member what they were supposed to initiate, whereas there
might be poor motivation underlying the lack of initiative in
patients with vmPFC damage.
Importantly for our study, patients’ relatives perceived sig-
nificant personality changes following hippocampal damage,
especially changes related to emotional and social interper-
sonal interactions. This interpretation is further supported by
statements made by the hippocampal-damaged patients them-
selves; Figure 6 includes a statement from each patient that
was independently corroborated by their relatives from the
ISPC. Upon asking how they think they have changed, patients
most often answered that they are now more emotional and
socially nervous.
Figure 4. Strategies and example responses. a, Percentage of patients with hippocampal damage (red) and healthy control participants (blue) who responded “yes” to debriefing questions for
the personal high-conflict scenarios. The majority of patients with hippocampal damage responded to the high-conflict scenarios based on an emotional rejection of causing harm to even one
person. Themajority of controls used strategies that additionally took account of rational issues pertaining to future benefitswhen deciding inwhich cases it would be excusable to harm somebody.
Moreover, whereas the majority of patients with hippocampal damage did not visualize the high-conflict scenarios in greater detail than any of the other scenarios, control participants visualized
vivid scenes in greater detail for the high-conflict than any other scenario classes. b, Examples of strategies used by the patients and healthy controls.
McCormick et al. • Hippocampal Damage and Moral Judgments J. Neurosci., November 30, 2016 • 36(48):12157–12167 • 12163
Discussion
The hippocampus and vmPFC are strongly connected both ana-
tomically and functionally (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Catani
et al., 2012, 2013), and they commonly coactivate during fMRI
tasks that require construction of mental scenes, such as thinking
about the past or future (Addis et al., 2007), and navigation
(Spreng et al., 2009). One way to try to dissociate their functional
roles is to administer tasks typically associated with one structure
to patients with selective damage to the other. The main goal of
this study was therefore to examine how patients with selective
bilateral hippocampal damage respond on a task widely associ-
ated with the vmPFC, namely moral decision making. We found
that patients with hippocampal damage showed significantly re-
duced utilitarian responses on personal high-conflict scenarios
compared with both matched healthy control participants and
previously studied patients with vmPFC damage (Koenigs et al.,
2007). Response rates for all other types of scenarios did not differ
between the hippocampal-damaged patients and controls, indi-
cating the patients were able to keep relevant information in
mind and understood the rationale of the scenarios. This finding
accords with extant literature demonstrating that patients with
hippocampal damage could think rationally in situations requir-
ing counterfactual alternatives (Mullally andMaguire, 2014) and
simulating the mental states of others (Rosenbaum et al., 2007).
The dual-process theory of moral judgments posits that for a
personal dilemma, two psychological systems, emotion and cog-
nition, are pitched against each other, leading to an internal con-
flict situation (Greene et al., 2004). This conflict causes an initial
adverse emotional response to the proposed terrible action (i.e.,
killing somebody), followed by a cognitive re-evaluation of the
future benefits associated with that action (i.e., saving lives) and,
in the end, this leads to an informed coherent emotional-
cognitive decision. This is precisely what control participants de-
scribed in the current study.
To map this complex process to specific brain regions, the
dual-process theory suggests that the vmPFC is necessary to reg-
Figure 5. Personality changes following hippocampal damage. a, Means and SEs of change scores for all 24 clinical characteristics of the ISPC for hippocampal-damaged patients.
Personality characteristics are shown in decreasing order of the magnitude of change. b, Difference in mean change scores for the same 24 clinical characteristics between hippocampal-
damaged and previously published vmPFC-damaged (Barrash et al., 2000) patients. Characteristics are displayed in increasing order of the difference between both patient groups in this
exploratory analysis. Changes greater in patients with vmPFC damage are depicted in gray; changes greater in hippocampal-damaged patients are displayed in red. *p 0.05, **p
0.01. Compared to patients with hippocampal lesions, patients with vmPFC damage tend to be more irritable and less emotional. By contrast, hippocampal damage leaves patients
feeling more easily overwhelmed than patients with vmPFC damage.
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ister or integrate the adverse emotional response into a coherent
decision (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2007; Shenhav and Greene,
2014), leading patients with damage to that region to make more
utilitarian responses. In agreement with this model, the skin
conductance of vmPFC-damaged patients did not increase in
response to personal scenarios (Moretto et al., 2010). Unfortu-
nately, there are no data on the cognitive strategies used by
vmPFC-damaged patients to aid in understanding why they
choose the utilitarian option.
Interestingly, we found the opposite effect in hippocampal-
damaged patients; that is, significantly fewer utilitarian responses
and an increased emotional response to the personal high-
conflict moral dilemmas. The patients showed the same pattern
of skin conductance response as control participants, but overall
it was increased. Since this patient population typically shows
normal autonomic responses (Bechara et al., 1995;Gutbrod et al.,
2006), and the amygdala volumes of our patients did not differ
from those of the control participants, our finding seems indica-
tive of a task-related emotional response and notmerely a general
autonomic or emotional dysfunction. Consistent with this find-
ing, the decision-making strategies used by patients were based
on an emotional, instinctive gut feeling not to harm anybody. It
appears that patients got stuck in the emotional aspect of the
dilemmas and were unable to overcome the initial adverse re-
sponse and move on to re-evaluating and visualizing the bigger
picture that would include saving multiple lives.
There is scant information about prolonged or intensified
immediate emotionality in hippocampal-damaged patients.
However, there is some evidence that compared with controls,
negative emotions linger longer in such patients (Feinstein et al.,
2010). Further, hippocampal-damaged patients designated mor-
ally bad actions as significantly worse compared with patients
with vmPFC damage (Croft et al., 2010). It appears, therefore,
that an immediate adverse emotional reaction to undesirable ac-
tions might become overwhelming for patients with hippocam-
pal damage. This conclusion accords with the feedback on the
ISPC from close relatives. They rated the patients as being more
easily overwhelmed andmore dependent than theywere premor-
bidly. In contrast to patients with vmPFCdamage, it is interesting
to note that the hippocampal-damaged patients seemed to be-
come more emotional after their illness. Notably, this was con-
firmed by patients themselves, with the majority mentioning
increased emotionality or social nervousness when asked
whether they had changed from before their illness.
We believe the increased emotionality of the hippocampal-
damaged patients is reactive rather than primary. Unlike patients
with vmPFC damage, patients with hippocampal damage typi-
cally do not lack insight into their illness state. All of the patients
we tested knew they had a memory problem. In addition, previ-
ous research concludes that the role of the hippocampus, while
possibly involved in anxiety responses, is not essential for pri-
mary emotional functioning (Clark and Maguire, 2016). How-
ever, what is clear across a number of different cognitive domains
is that patients with hippocampal damage have a reduced ability
to mentally construct spatially coherent scenes (Maguire and
Mullally, 2013; Clark andMaguire, 2016; Zeidman andMaguire,
2016). In line with this, the hippocampal-damaged patients
tested here did not visualize the high-conflict scenarios in their
imagination as often as control participants. Although a de-
creased capacity to visualize scenes could potentially lead to over-
rationalizing and hence to more utilitarian responses (Amit and
Greene, 2012), in fact, visualization in healthy controls might
serve to overcome the negative emotional response, enabling
controls to imagine the future in which they would save multiple
lives. Thus, this reduced ability to imagine scenes in the patients
may have led to a dependency on a gut reaction in emotionally
challenging situations that was manifested as deontological,
rather than an informed global and flexibly achieved decision.
This interpretation accords with recent models of morality in
which deontological judgments are viewed as based on rigid
decision-making processes (model-free) that depend solely on
previously learned experiences (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013).
Often, real-life situations and those tested in the laboratory,
such as counterfactual thinking (Mullally and Maguire, 2014) or
theory of mind (Rosenbaum et al., 2007), are not very emotion-
ally challenging, and in those circumstances patients with hip-
pocampal damagemight be able to rely on both systems, emotion
and cognition, equally well. For example, Craver et al. (2016) did
not find a deontological bias in patients whose damage involved,
but was not limited to, the hippocampi (i.e., they may have had
amygdala damage). They used amoral dilemmas paradigmwhere
participants were asked “what is morally acceptable,” potentially
detracting from the emotional intensity, and hence provoking
more abstract or rational responses. However, in the highly emo-
tionally charged context of the personalmoral dilemmas tested in
the current study, patients with selective bilateral hippocampal
damage had to answer “what would you do” in very difficult
moral situations. This might have caused them to become over-
whelmed with emotions because they could not imagine any-
thing beyond immediately harming this one person. Hence, they
responded in an understandable manner by stepping back and
avoiding any kind of harmful action (O’Neil et al., 2015). This
does not exclude the possibility that the patients’ emotional pro-
file was influenced by structural/functional connectivity changes
Figure6. Introspective responses frompatientswith hippocampal damage regardingpersonality changes. An example response fromeachpatient (corroborated by their relatives from the ISPC)
with hippocampal damage to the question of whether they think they had changed following their illness. These answers were collected independently of the moral dilemmas task. The patients
described changes in emotionality and social interactions.
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between the hippocampus and such areas as the amygdala even in
the context, as here, of normal amygdala volumes.
It is interesting to note that, like patients with hippocampal
damage (Hassabis et al., 2007;Mullally et al., 2012), patients with
vmPFCdamage also seem to have difficulty constructing spatially
coherent scenes (Bertossi et al., 2016). It could, therefore, be that
patients with vmPFC damage suffer a double hit on the moral
dilemmas task. That is, they lose the ability to vividly visualize the
scenario and what it would mean to harm a person but also to
save others, and additionally they cannot detect the adverse emo-
tional reaction that comes with the prospect of harming a person.
For them, the personal high-conflict scenarios might, in the end,
be simply reduced to a numbers game ofmaximizing the number
of survivors. By contrast, patients with hippocampal damage
have a reduced ability to visualize the scenarios but the emotional
reaction is preserved and presumably facilitated by their intact
vmPFC. In the future, it would be interesting to examine whether
hippocampal-damaged patients’ moral dilemma responses “nor-
malize” if information is provided in an already visualized form
and is available throughout a task.
In summary, we found the opposite effect to the commonly
reported utilitarian bias in vmPFC-damaged patients when we
tested patients with bilateral hippocampal damage; that is, a
strong deontological bias not to harm anybody. We suggest that
visualization is used by healthy controls to make an overall in-
formed decision on these moral dilemmas, and if this ability is
impaired, one is forced to react to whatever signals remain. In the
case of the hippocampal-damaged patients, this is the adverse
emotional reaction to harming somebody. If this emotional re-
action is also impaired, as in patients with vmPFC damage, what
is left is a calculated judgment based solely on the greatest num-
ber of survivors. Overall, these results provide new insights into
the processes involved in moral decision making and highlight
the complementary roles played by two closely connected brain
regions.
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